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Abstract: This study examines earnings management dynamics in Portuguese listed 
firms. It provides evidence consistent with firms using accrual and real management as 
substitutes. Besides, the use of each strategy appears to depend on its relative cost. This 
investigation also points to the existence of a trade-off between derivatives use and the 
magnitude of earnings management. Furthermore, the impact of both earnings 
management and derivatives use on effective tax rates is examined. The results indicate 
that, if the tax function is convex, firms can reduce tax expenses by hedging with 
derivatives. This research also explores how earnings management practices are related 
with a set of market and financial incentives, while controlling for earnings 
management constraints. Meeting dividend thresholds seems to be the most relevant 
incentive for firms to manage earnings upward. 
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Resumo: Este trabalho analisa dinâmicas no âmbito da gestão de resultados nas 
empresas cotadas na bolsa de valores de Lisboa. Fornece evidência consistente com a 
existência de um efeito substituição entre 2 métodos alternativos, utilizados no âmbito 
da gestão de resultados: um baseado na flexibilidade das normas de relato financeiro e 
um outro relacionado com a estruturação da atividade da empresa. O recurso a cada um 
destes métodos está relacionado com o seu custo relativo. Adicionalmente, esta 
investigação aponta para a existência de uma relação inversa entre a utilização de 
produtos derivados e a magnitude da gestão de resultados. É ainda analisado o impacto 
destas práticas, bem como da utilização de derivados, nas taxas de imposto efetivas. Os 
resultados indicam que no contexto de convexidade fiscal, as empresas podem amenizar 
os encargos fiscais com recurso a derivados. Este estudo integra igualmente uma análise 
que visa examinar como é que a gestão de resultados está relacionada com incentivos 
financeiros e de mercado. De acordo com a análise empírica realizada, alcançar os 
resultados que permitem o pagamento do valor esperado de dividendos, é a motivação 
mais relevante neste contexto.  
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1. Introduction
If the main objective of financial reporting is to enlighten stakeholders so they can make 
efficient economic decisions, it is essential to assess the quality of financial information. 
Addressing earrings management practices is relevant in order to how the quality of 
information that is linked with executive discretionary options. Nowadays, given the 
complex context in which firms operate, earnings management may be seen has a 
continuous and iterative process characterized by a mixture of incentives and practices. 
There are several incentives to engage in earnings management, which managers need 
to weight. Likewise, there are different ways to drive earnings and cash flows in a 
certain direction. The choices between diverse types of earnings management are 
certainly not independent.  Furthermore, puzzling earnings management gives the 
chance to anticipate the risk of a companies’ underlying information, given the presence 
of certain motivations and constraints. Therefore, this study is important to investors in 
general, borrowing institutions when assessing credit characteristics and auditors while 
evaluating audit-risk. It is also relevant to Portuguese market regulators, mainly 
CMVM1, but also ASF2 and Bank of Portugal since financial institutions are usually 
relevant stakeholders3 of Portuguese listed firms. In addition, it is pertinent for the 
Portuguese Tax Authorities given that this research addresses how earnings 
management and derivatives use are associated with effective tax rates.  
This study has increased relevance given that, regarding earnings management, 
literature that focused on Portuguese context is minor. Aiming Portuguese listed firms, 
it is possible to point the work of Mendes and Rodrigues (2006) that have analyzed 
earnings smoothing practices using Eckel approach (1981) and Alves (2011, 2012) that 
related discretionary accruals with board characteristics and ownership structure, 
respectively. An overall measure of real activities-based management have never been 
developed for Portugal and consequently never associated with accrual-based 
management. In a first stage of this research, it is tested the existence of a trade-off 
between the two strategies. Moreover, one tries to understand what drives the 
1 Portuguese Securities Market Commission. 
2 Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Authority. 
3 They are usually both borrowers and shareholders of those firms. 
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preferences of the decision makers towards each earnings management scheme. 
Thereafter, a total measure of earnings management, that is, one that accounts for both 
strategies is applied in the examinations that follow. Then, it is analyzed how 
derivatives use may relate with earnings management decisions, because firms may 
smooth earnings by managing them (whether through accrual or real management 
strategies) or by hedging with derivatives. Furthermore, three kinds of earnings 
management drivers are studied, namely tax, financial and market incentives. Tax 
incentives are analyzed separately for methodological reasons. For that matter, effective 
tax rates are regressed in a set of determinants (firm specific and non-firm specific 
characteristics) to which proxies of earnings management, as well as a variable that 
captures the use of derivatives are added. Empirical literature analyzing hedging 
policies in Portuguese listed firms is also scarce. This study presents an empirically 
examination that clarifies why Portuguese listed firms hedge with derivatives. The main 
purpose of this analysis is to understand if tax convexity influence firms probability to 
use derivatives. In a final stage, it is investigated how earnings management are related 
with financial and market incentives. Specifically, it is tested if firms manage earnings 
upward to: report positive earnings (instead of losses); present increases in reported 
income (and not declines); diminish the cost of capital when contracting high amounts 
of long-term debt; meet dividend thresholds. 
This research contributes to the literature by computing both accrual and real activities-
based management proxies at firm level. The typical industry-year estimations were not 
employed due to a small number of observations per industry. Besides, this is the first 
research in which a total measure of earnings management is related with derivatives 
use. Moreover, it is the first to present evidence that hedging policies and earnings 
management practices may be defined sequentially. It also contributes to the literature 
related with taxation by demonstrating empirically that firms can reduce tax expenses 
through the use of derivatives if the tax function is convex. Furthermore, this is the first 
investigation to provide empirical proof that firms’ hedging policies are influenced by 
tax convexity. In addition, this study looks at the impact of firms’ ability to manage 
earnings on effective tax rates, both through accruals and real activities. One 
methodological contribution of this research is the proxy for the cost of capital. It has 
never been used in corporate finance literature; however, it is a complete measure of the 
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costs of financing because it captures not only interest rates but also other credit 
characteristics, such as covenants and collateral requirements. Finally, when studying 
firms’ financial and market incentives to manage earnings, this study differentiates from 
other researches because both kinds of earnings management are considered, a reliable 
variable to control for earnings management constraints is used and the various 
motivations are tested at the same time, so that one can understand the relative 
importance of each one. 
To develop the analysis mentioned a panel data set with 38 non-financial Portuguese 
listed firms was used. The time period starts with the adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and ends in 2014. 
This study is organized as follows: section 2 presents the literature review as well as the 
research hypothesis; in section 3 the methodology is described; section 4 provides the 
results and its analysis; per last, section 5 presents the concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Definition 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) related earrings management with managers’ 
discretionary decisions that impact on financial reports. Healy and Wahlen (1999) stated 
that “Management’s use of judgement (also) creates opportunities for earnings 
management, in which managers choose reporting methods and estimates that do not 
adequately reflect their firms’ underlying economics”. 
It is important to highlight that earnings management does not imply fraudulent 
behavior. Accounting principles generally have some flexibility embedded, which is 
important, in the context of dynamic, innovative and sometimes considerably specific 
business environments. Nonetheless, the flexibility of General Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAPs) may also lead to discretionary options motivated by incentives that 
do not match the purpose of presenting a truthful picture of firms’ situation. Still, 
discretionary choices that explore GAAPs’ flexibility are not necessarily fraudulent. 
Using accrual management, managers are able to increase reported earnings by 
aggressively diminishing provisions. When using real management managers may slow 
R&D or advertisement expenses. They violate GAAPs, incurring in fraudulent behavior, 
when recording fictional sales or by recording them before they are realizable (Dechow 
and Skinner, 2000)1. This study does not entail that firms adopt fraudulent practices. 
2.2. Accrual-based management vs real activities-based management 
When studying the relation between executive bonus schemes and accounting decisions, 
Healy (1985) planted the seeds to a string of literature that tries to measure the 
magnitude of earnings management through abnormal accruals. The most remarkable 
feature in Healy approach was the use of a proxy that captures overall accounting 
options and not just particular decisions, as in prior studies (Biddle, 1980; Bowen et al., 
1 See Dechow and Skinner (2000) for a discussion of earnings management views. 
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1981). Indeed, Watts and Zimmerman (1990) pointed that “focusing on one accounting 
method reduces the power of the tests”. Since then, the literature has been developing 
models to extract the abnormal component of total accruals (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 
1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 2006; 
Dechow et al., 2012). 
The main alternative to proxy for earnings management is real activity-based 
management2. Although the analysis of this dimension of earnings management is more 
recent, it may be the main earnings management strategy, given managers’ responses on 
Graham et al. (2005) conducted inquiry. Managers can choose to adjust earnings 
through both processes therefore, it is important to account for both. Moreover, recently 
Zang (2011) has illustrated a trade-off between the two kinds of earnings management, 
in the context of a sequential decision, while using firms-years observations in which 
earnings are supposed to be managed so that firms can report small earnings (instead of 
earnings below 0) and avoid earnings decline3. As in Zang (2011), firms are expected to 
firstly decide on the amount of real management and then adjust the magnitude of 
accrual management, mainly, at the end of the year (or at least to adjust earnings using 
accounting flexibility to compensate unanticipated developments that affected cash 
flows). Thus, the following hypothesis is tested:  
H1: Portuguese listed firms use real activities-based management and accrual-based 
management as substitutes, in the context of a sequential decision.  
2.3. Tax incentives and derivatives 
The tax avoidance related literature is vast4 (Stickney and McGee, 1983; Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997; Dyreng et al., 2008; Dyreng et al., 2010; Kraft, 2014). Graham (2003) 
mentioned hedging policies when reporting some decisions that can be influenced by 
2 Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2008) and Kothari et al. (2012) 
analyze empirically these strategies;  
3 Zang (2011), whenever possible, also includes firms just beating analysts’ forecasts.  See Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997), Degeorge et al. (1997) or Dechow et al. (2003) for an analysis of market incentives. 
4 Dyreng et al. (2008) defined tax avoidance as anything that reduces taxes. Other lexicons may also be 
used (Minick and Noga, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012).  
6 
taxation. The use of derivatives to minimize tax expenses if the tax function is convex5 
was proposed by Smith and Stulz (1985). Meanwhile, several researchers gave attention 
to the use of derivatives with the objective of reducing tax expenses (Alworth, 1998; 
Graham and Rodgers, 2002; Warren, 2004). Recently, Dohone (2015) was able to 
quantify the tax savings related with hedging strategies. Indeed, some literature related 
firm value with the use of derivatives (Bartram et al., 2011; Allayanniset al., 2012; 
Ahmed et al., 2013; Nova et al., 2015), which may at least partly, be explained by tax 
savings, as predicted by Smith and Stulz in 1985. Nevertheless, researchers were not 
able to document empirically a strong association between derivatives use and tax 
convexity (Nance et al., 1993; Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Allayanis and Ofek, 
2001; Graham and Rodgers, 2002).  
From 2010 onwards, a marginal state tax was applied for Portuguese firms. In 2010, to 
the component of taxable income above €2 million corresponded an additional tax rate 
of 2.5%. In almost a year basis the state tax was being adjusted, in a way that the 
marginal state tax applied started to be divided in various categories of taxable income. 
In 2014 the state marginal tax rate was 3%, 5% and 7%, if taxable income was higher 
than €1.5 million, €7.5 million and €35 million, respectively. Besides, state tax was 
applied, independently of the existence of net operating losses. This created a worthy 
studying scenario to test for the responsiveness of hedging policies to tax convexity. 
Therefore the following two hypotheses are tested: 
H2: In the presence of a convexity tax function, hedging firms have lower effective tax 
rates. 
H3: Derivatives use is positively related with convexity. 
Furthermore, firms might manage earnings to decrease tax expenses by reducing 
earnings volatility (same effect of derivatives) or just by simply decreasing reported 
earnings. Firms with more incentives to reduce earnings are big firms, as usually are the 
5 Tax function is convex when successive increases in pre-tax income lead to each time smaller increases 
in after-tax income. See Smith and Stulz (1985) or Graham and Smith (1999) for a more developed 
description of tax convexity. 
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listed ones, to reduce political costs (Zimmerman, 1983), that could be reflected through 
the tax system. However, tax savings may not be the primary motivations of firms when 
they engage in earnings management. Firms that manage earnings in response to market 
incentives may have higher effective tax rates. Still, as pointed by Desai (2005), 
because financial and tax reports follow different rules, managers may manage book 
profits upward, and the same time manage profits that are reported to the tax authorities 
downwardly. This way, firms may send positive signs to the markets and still diminish 
tax expenses. Accordingly, in this study, the influence of earnings management 
practices on effective tax rates are verified, nevertheless no anticipation about the 
direction of the relation is done. Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H4: Accrual-based management practices impact on firms’ effective tax rates. 
H5: Real activity-based management practices impact on firms’ effective tax rates. 
2.4. Derivatives and earnings management 
There is extensive literature that examines firms’ earnings smoothing practices 
(Kirscheheiter and Melumad, 2002; Shaw, 2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Gao and 
Zhang, 2015). Using GAAPs’ flexibility or operational decisions, firms may be able to 
smooth earnings. Jung et al. (2013) is a recent example of studies that relate earnings 
smoothing with accruals-based approach, while Roychowdhury (2006) also considered 
real management strategies. Derivatives are also supposed to be used to reduce earnings 
volatility. Hence, firms may choose to smooth earnings, through earnings management 
or with derivatives. Barton (2001) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) presented evidence 
consistent with derivatives and discretionary accruals being used as substitutes. 
Nonetheless, those researchers related discretionary accruals with derivatives notional 
amounts, in the case of a simultaneous decision. The hypothesis developed in this study 
is different in two ways. It is predicted the existence of a sequential decision (1), which 
means that firms firstly decide on the use or non-use of derivatives. Then, firms that 
hedge will have smoother earnings, therefore they will probably rely to a lesser extent in 
earnings management strategies to smooth earnings.  In addition, this investigation 
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associates the use of derivatives with a measure of total earnings management (2), since 
it considers real activities-based management and not only the accrual-based 
component. 
H6: Portuguese listed firms use derivatives and earnings management schemes has 
substitutes, in the context of a sequential decision. 
2.5. Financial and market incentives 
The purpose of analyzing financial and market incentives is to understand the main 
motivations for Portuguese listed firms to manage earnings. Portugal is a code-law 
country in which firms usually rely on bank debt. Christensen et al. (2015) 
acknowledged that firms which had closer connections with banks had fewer incentives 
to adopt more comprehensive accounting standards. Firms might manage earnings 
upward to reduce the cost of capital when borrowing from banks. To capture not only 
interest costs, but also conditions related with covenants and collaterals, qualitative data 
on bank lending survey is used to proxy for credit availability. Swiston (2008) and 
Angelopoulou et al. (2014) showed the importance of the survey data when examining 
credit availability. The following hypothesis is tested: 
H7: Firms manage earnings upward if they contract large amounts of debt in a year of 
financial tightening. 
The literature usually defines that firms reporting small positive earnings or just beating 
previous years’ earnings are more likely to be managing earnings (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Zang, 2011). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) suggested that firms managed 
earrings in those cases because the authors detected unusually low frequencies in firms 
reporting small decreases in earnings or small losses; and unusually high frequencies of 
small positive earnings or small earnings increases. However, Dechow et al. (2003) 
could not confirm those firms boosted discretionary accruals to report small positive 
earnings. In this study, it is investigated if those are relevant thresholds for Portuguese 
listed firms, when managing earnings. The following hypotheses are tested: 
H8: Portuguese listed firms manage earnings upward to avoid earnings losses. 
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H9: Portuguese listed firms manage earnings upward to beet previous years’ earnings. 
The literature demonstrated managers’ aversion to apply dividend cuts (Lintner, 1956; 
Brav et al., 2005). This is because dividends are of first order factors for investors 
(DeAngelo et al., 2006; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006). As a result, dividend cuts may 
have significant downward effects on stock prices (Grullon et al., 2002). This 
motivation is consistent with the pecking order theory that suggests dividends are sticky 
(Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Naveen et al. (2008) 
presented evidence that firms manage earnings through discretionary accruals to be able 
to pay expected dividends, given the existence of dividend covenants. This kind of 
covenants is usually applied6 to minimize agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
between firms (managers and shareholders) and creditors (Easterbrook, 1984; 
Brockman and Unlu, 2009).Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H10: Portuguese listed firms manage earnings upward to meet expected dividends. 
6 See, for example, Kalay (1982) or Bradley and Roberts (2004). 
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3. Methodology and sample selection
3.1. Sample selection 
This study focuses on firms listed on Lisbon stock exchange in the year of 2014. The 
sample starts in 2004 and ends in 20141. Observations for 2004 are used only when data 
available is based IFRS2. Firms excluded from the study are: (1) financial institutions 
(sic code 60-67); (2) firms in which the main activity is related with services-
membership sports and recreation clubs (sic code 7997); (3) firms with no available 
information in Datastream3; (4) Firms listed during only 1 year. As a result, this analysis 
uses 38 non-financial Portuguese firms listed in the Lisbon stock exchange in 2014.  
3.2. Estimations at firm-level 
The abnormal component of both the accruals and the cash-flow from operations are 
used to proxy accrual and real management, respectively. Regarding this approach, this 
study has two limitations, which are immediate constraints of focusing the study on 
Portuguese listed firms. Firstly, there is a reduced number of firms, when compared 
with other studies, such as the ones of Roychowdhury (2006) and of Zang (2011), 
which were important benchmarks for this research. Secondly, the models used to 
calculate abnormal accruals (or abnormal cash-flows) are usually estimated for each 
industry-year. However, the number of listed firms for each industry is usually very 
small. Hence, the usual methodology cannot be employed, given the common five to 
twenty minimum observations threshold is not met. In fact, the industries with more 
observations are composed by 3 firms (when defining industries with 2 digits sic codes). 
These are two structural characteristics of the Portuguese capital markets. Thus, to study 
earnings management dynamics in Portugal, the usual approaches need to be adjusted. 
In order to surpass the constraints related with Portuguese environment, firm specific 
estimations are applied. Firms’ specific samples start when financial reporting based on 
1 Variables definition, measurement and sources are available in the Annex (Table 7-10). 
2 Indeed, the sample start is predetermined by the adoption of IFRS.  
3 Datastream is the main data source of this study. 
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IFRS is available, which for most firms is 2005 (the year of mandatory adoption4). The 
sample ends in 2014, which implies 10/11 observations for most firms. Both firm and 
industry specific attributes play an important role in abnormal accrual estimations. 
There is a component of accruals that relates with firm characteristics, such as 
operations volatility (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), uncertainty (Palepu et al., 2000), 
internal control characteristics (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989) and other factors that may 
lead to misjudgments. Only a second component of abnormal accruals relates with 
possible opportunistic use of accounting rules. For example, omitted variables bias is an 
important issue in accrual-based estimations (Dechow et al., 2010). Therefore, there is 
value added in the use of firm specific estimations. The trade-off behind firm-level 
estimations relates with difficulties in capturing industry shocks. For example, if there is 
a relevant increase in a production input for a certain industry, the typical industry-year 
approach to estimate discretionary accruals, are more likely to be unresponsive to it. A 
firm specific procedure is probably weaker in this scenario, and would most likely 
predict abnormal accruals, which weakens the robustness of the estimations that use 
abnormal accruals to proxy for earnings management. Dechow et al. (2010) have also 
discussed this approach and stated: “We emphasize that all of the accruals models can 
be estimated at the firm level”.  According to the authors, estimations at firm level have 
the advantage of allowing for variation in the coefficients of the determinants of the 
normal levels of accruals within firms, however, those models have invariant time 
parameters and possibly survivorship bias. They also highlight that, in the case of the 
usual industry-level estimations, some firms may be associated with higher residuals 
because of industry classification and not because of earnings management practices or 
errors. In addition, listed firms usually play a role in different sectors. Therefore, the use 
of industry classifications may also soften the power of the tests.   
A brief discussion of alternatives: (1) a possible substitute procedure to the firm specific 
approach would be to make industry-year estimations using 1 digit sic codes, which 
does not solve the usual observations threshold and still some firms need to be dropped. 
Moreover, it upturns industry-level estimations weaknesses, because one would have 
4 In 2005 firms had to present financial reports based on IFRS, not only for 2005 but also for 2004, so that 
comparison with the previous year could be made. Nonetheless, Datastream does not have data for the 
year of 2004 for all firms. 
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considerably different firms with the same coefficients for the determinants of both 
normal accruals and cash-flow from operations. (2) Estimating the models cross-
sectionally using the whole sample should boost to the same bias, since listed firms are 
significantly heterogeneous, which is clear when considering the distribution of firms 
by industries. Therefore, this procedure does not yield any of the advantages mentioned 
before. Nonetheless it can capture shocks that affect most firms, but this can also be 
achieved through time effects in the models that follow. Specifically, in this study, 
estimations of earnings management are used has inputs in other models, in which is 
possible to account for dynamics such as time related effects. (3) Another alternative is 
to include public firms from other European countries in the estimations of both 
abnormal accruals and cash-flows, in order to achieve the minimum number of 
observations. This way, the usual methods could be applied. Nonetheless, firms from 
other countries may operate in a very a different context due to economic, institutional 
and regulatory differences. Moreover, one of the main purposes of this study is to 
understand the Portuguese specific environment, providing insights that yield value for 
Portuguese researchers and policy makers, given the scarcity of empirically robust 
investigations regarding earnings management. (4) Another option corresponds to the 
use of the biggest non-listed Portuguese firms for each industry and apply industry-year 
estimations. Nevertheless, the differences among listed and non-listed are probably 
significant. Most financial reports of non-listed firms are based on Portuguese GAAPs, 
while listed firms use IFRS. Overall, none of the alternative options are expected to 
produce more robust estimates. The use of firm specific estimations has highlighted has 
both advantages and disadvantages when compared to the usual industry level analysis. 
Since recent literature that uses this approach is slight, a contribution is made, by 
presenting evidence on the use of firm-level estimations. 
 
3.3. Accrual-based management 
 
Since Healy (1985), models to estimate the normal level of accruals have been 
developed. The Jones model (1991), extracts the abnormal component of accruals, using 
both changes in sales and property, plant and equipment. Later, the model was adjusted 
by Dechow et al. (1995), so that credit sales are not included as a determinant of normal 
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accruals, since credit sales may be related with earnings management. This is the model 
applied in this study. Other models have built on the modified version of the Jones 
model, such as the procedure presented in Kothari et al. (2005), which  is not used in 
this analysis, mainly because it is not possible, given the heterogeneity between the 
firms under analysis, to identify a similar firm in the same industry with the closest 
return on assets. The Modified Jones with control variables concerning the asymmetric 
recognition of gains and losses (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006) is not applied since it 
leads, in some cases, to multicollinearity, if a firm-level approach is employed. The 
modified Jones model merged with the Dechow and Dichev (2002) methodology, as 
suggested by McNichols (2002), can only be used to compute normal current accruals. 
Moreover, it consumes more grades of freedom and implies that accruals must revert in 
the following year, which may not always be the case. Likewise, the estimations of 
abnormal accruals are used to regress in other variables, which gives the opportunity to 
account for measurement error with adequate controls later5.  
Discretionary accruals are proxied by the residuals of the following model, which is 
based on the modified version (Dechow et al., 1995) of Jones (1991) model: 
ttttt PPEARkREVTAC   *)*)1((* 210    (3.1)
Where for each year t,  TAC corresponds to total accruals6, ∆REV refers to the change in 
revenue between t-1 and t, ∆AR is the change in accounts receivable, PPE corresponds 
to the  value of property, plant and equipment. The error term is represented by εt. All 
variables are scaled by lagged total assets. K corresponds to the slope coefficient of a 
regression of ∆AR on ∆REV, when the p-value of the coefficient is lower than 25% (0 
otherwise)7. Thus, only a portion of credit sales are related to earnings management, but 
5 This is not the case when researchers use abnormal accruals has an immediate measure of earnings 
quality.  
6Total accruals are computed as the difference between net income and cash-flow from operations. 
Alternatively they can be calculated as the change in net current assets minus change in cash plus change 
in current portion of long term debt minus depreciations. However, not all firms disclose information 
about the current portion of long term debt, hence, it cannot be computed. 
7 The purpose is to include a component of credit sales as a determinant of normal accruals,  but only if 
credit sales are explained by changes in sales. Because the regressions are control lacking, the 
significance level defined is softer.  
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only if there is some evidence that changes in sales explain the  change in credit sales.  
The residual of equation (3.1) is used to proxy for accrual management. 
3.4. Real activities-based management 
It is usually proxied by overproduction, abnormal discretionary expenses or abnormal 
cash-flows from operations (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2011; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2008; Cohen et al., 2008), even so, some researchers only use abnormal research and 
development expenses (Baber et al., 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Bushee, 1998; 
Bens, 2002; Kothari et al., 2012). Overproduction may not be adequate to compute for 
some firms in the services sector. One alternative is to drop firms from these industries, 
which is not possible given the number of firms under analysis is not vast. Likewise, in 
these circumstances, the conclusions of this research would yield lesser value. 
Discretionary expenses are commonly defined as the sum of research and development 
expenses, selling and general administrative expenses and advertisement expenses. 
Nonetheless, one factor that distinguishes Portuguese firms from others is the 
propensity to present the income statement in a nature based and not in a functional 
form. Therefore, the components of discretionary expenses, including selling and 
general administrative expenses, are generally not disclosed and consequently not 
available in Datastream. As a result, in this study, real management is proxied by 
abnormal cash-flow from operations.  
The normal level of cash-flow from operations is estimated with the following model 
(Roychowdhury, 2006): 
tttt REVREVCFO   ** 210 (3.2) 
Where for year t, CFO corresponds to cash-flow from operations, REV refers to revenue 
and ∆REV is the change in revenue from the previous year. All variables are scaled by 
lagged total assets. The residual of equation (3.2) equals the abnormal cash-flow from 
operations. 
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3.5.  Accrual-based management vs real activities-based management 
The dynamics between both kinds of earnings management are studied using Zang 
(2011) setting as baseline. Specifically, the following regressions are applied: 
ttyytxkt
CONTROLSDEMRM   ,,2,,10 *_* (3.3) 
tttyytxkt RMCONTROLSDEMAM   *_* 3,,2,,10 (3.4) 
Where for year t and firm i, RM corresponds to real management and is proxied by the 
residual of equation (3.2). AM refers to the amount of accrual management and is 
quantified by the residual of equation (3.1). EM_D are a set of determinants of each 
type of earnings management. CONTROLS are control variables.  
Zang (2011) only included suspect firms-years, that is, the ones most likely to be 
managing earnings, while controlling for non-random sample bias with Heckman two 
step procedure. The author defined suspect as firm-years in which earnings are barely 
above last year reported income, just beating the null benchmark or the analysts’ 
consensus forecasts. Indeed, many researchers have found indications of discontinuity 
in the distribution of earnings, especially in firm-years with zero to small earnings 
(Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Even so, studies such as the one of 
Dechow et al. (2003) were not able to provide reliable evidence that firms manage 
earnings to avoid losses. Therefore this “a priori” hypothesis of Zang (2011) may also 
be costly, mainly if firms just beating zero earnings benchmarks are firms managing 
earnings downwardly, in order to, for example, minimize tax expenses. Likewise, in the 
presented analysis, observations cannot restrict to firm years in these circumstances, 
given in this case the sample would be reduced to 64 observations8.  
8 64 observations equals the sum of 35 firm-years in which the change in earnings per share are between 0 
and 2 cents and 29 firm-years in which return-on-assets is between 0 and half percent. 
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The earnings management determinants considered are: 
i.The marginal tax rate (MTR) is assumed to restrict real management because those
practices are more likely to lead to higher costs related with taxation. When managing
income upward through accounting-based methods, firms are able to increase earnings
but not necessarily taxable income (TI). In addition, firms are able to defer possible
additional tax expenses. Evidence of that is the study of Philips et al. (2003, 2004)
which hints deferred tax expenses can be used to detect earnings management. MTR is
set to zero if the firms’ pre-tax income is non-positive. In other cases, MTR equals the
nominal tax rate (TR) plus the state tax rate (STR).
Table 1: The nominal tax rate and the marginal state tax rate by year (%) 
Year TR STR 
2005 27.5 0 
2006 27.5 0 
2007 25 0 
2008 25 0 
2009 25 0 
2010 25 2.5 if TI ϵ ]2M, ∞[, 0 otherwise. 
2011 25 2.5 if TI ϵ ]2M, ∞[, 0 otherwise. 
2012 25 3 if TI ϵ ]1.5M, 10M], 5 if TI ϵ ]10M, ∞[, 0 otherwise. 
2013 25 3 if TI ϵ ]1.5M, 7.5M], 5 if TI ϵ ]7.5M, ∞[, 0 otherwise. 
2014 23 
3 if TI ϵ ]1.5M, 7.5M], 5 if TI ϵ ]7.5M, 35M], 7 if TI ϵ ]35M, 
∞[, 0 otherwise. 
   M=€Millions; 
ii.Insider ownership (INSIDER) equals 1 if the ratio between the shares owned by insiders 
and common shares outstanding are above sample median (0 otherwise). The literature 
usually indicates that insider ownership restricts earnings management because it may 
reduce agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and opportunistic behavior 
(Warfield et al., 1995). In practice, the process in which managers maximize their 
wealth is less likely to be costly to shareholders if managers’ incentives are aligned with 
shareholders’ interests. For example, Healy (1985) suggested that managers with low 
ownership may be more disposed to manage earnings upward to increase compensation 
(if compensation is a function of earnings). Nevertheless, the entrenchment hypothesis 
signals that insider ownership may also prompt self-interested actions (Cornett et al., 
2008). In this analysis, the purpose is to understand how insider ownership relates with 
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each kind of earnings management. It is expected that higher insider ownership biases 
the preferences of managers towards accrual management, because real management are 
more likely to negatively impact on operational efficiency and future competitiveness, 
affecting managers that are relevant shareholders. Accrual management is a more 
fictitious approach to drive earnings. As enhanced, even its impact on tax expenses can 
be more easily dispatched or postponed. Since RM occurs during the year, insider 
ownership is lagged in equation (3.3). In equation (3.4), the contemporaneous value is 
included, since AM is expected to take place mainly at the end of the year or to be 
responsive to RM intensity.  
iii.Financial health (HEALTH) is projected to be related with higher operational flexibility 
(while the inverse also applies), therefore, low HEALTH should act as a real 
management constraint. In addition, firms closer to bankruptcy have more incentives to 
manage earnings upward, since they are trying to stay alive (although, in the sample 
used, there are not a large number of firms in a position of significant financial distress). 
Those firms are expected to use accrual management to increase reported earnings. This 
premise is consistent with evidence presented by Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang 
(2011). The variable is lagged in equation (3.3) and contemporaneous in equation (3.4). 
























*4.1*0.1*3.0  (3.5) 
Where for each year t and firm i, TA is total assets, NI corresponds to net income, REV 
refers to revenue, R_EAR represents retained earnings, WC is working capital, MCAP 
denotes market capitalization and TL designates total liabilities; 
iv.The effect of board size (BOARD) on earnings management is rather unclear.
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the outcome of the resources that are applied
with the enlargement of the board. Bigger boards are supposed to sum more experience
and knowledge. However, crowded boards may lead to inefficiencies related with
difficulties of communication and coordination (Jensen, 1993).  Mather and Ramsay
18 
(2006) and Ching et al. (2006) concluded that board size is positively related with 
accrual management. It is expected that directors are particularly concerned about 
strategic decisions and less with accounting issues. As a result, they should more easily 
detect real management. In this study board size is the ratio between the number of 
directors and lagged total assets. 
v.In order to proxy for higher quality auditing a dummy variable (BIG4) that equals 1 if
the firm is audited by a Big4 (0 otherwise) is employed. The literature has shown that
Big4 auditing relates with lesser accrual management (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et
al., 1999), even though, Lawrence et al. (2011) presented indications that differences in
accrual management estimations of Big4 and non-Big4 clients are related with clients’
characteristics.  Zang (2011) concluded that Big4 auditing is negatively related with real
management and positively with accrual management and those results are expected to
hold for Portuguese listed firms. Overall, BOARD is projected to be positively
associated with accrual management.
vi.Firms with lengthier operational cycles (CYCLE) should more easily rely on accrual
management strategies since they will have both larger accrual accounts and longer
periods for accruals to reverse9 (Zang, 2011). This variable is first quantified as in
Dechow (1994)10 and then transformed into a dummy variable11 that equals 1 if a firm
has an operational cycle above the whole sample median and 0 otherwise.  The variable
is lagged in equation (3.3) and contemporaneous in equation (3.4).
vii.Barton and Simko (2002) indicated that net operating assets (NOA) incorporate previous 
accounting decisions, such as earnings management practices that rely on accounting 
principles’ flexibility. If a firm managed earnings upward in the past, current net 
9 One must also highlight that firms with lengthier operational cycles may be more exposed to shocks, 
which may lead to higher volatility in cash-flow from operations and in the accruals. Therefore, firms 
with lengthier operational cycles may be related with more abnormal accruals (or cash-flow from 
operations) not because of earnings management.  
10 The length of the operational cycle equals the days receivables are outstanding plus the number days 
products stay in stocks minus the number of days accounts payable are outstanding. 
11  The use of dummy variables incorporates important advantages by automatically accounting for 
outliers and non-linear relations between the variables. 
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operating assets will be overstated. It is expected that overstated net operating assets act 
as a constraint on current accrual management strategies. It is measured as total assets 
minus cash minus total liabilities plus total debt. This measure is then scaled by lagged 
sales. NOA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if net operating assets are above sample 
median at the beginning of the period (0 otherwise). 
viii.CONC is a dummy variable that equals 1 if no shareholder owns more 25% of firms’ 
shares (0 otherwise). It is used to proxy for ownership concentration. Although large 
shareholders are the ones with more incentives to monitor managers (Dechow et al., 
1995), which should constrain earnings management, the literature has usually found an 
empirical positive relationship between accrual management and ownership 
concentration (Choi et al., 2004; Alves, 2012; Rad et al., 2016). This is consistent with 
large shareholders pressuring managers to maximise their wealth, which may be 
translated in a higher magnitude of earnings management (Jaggi and Tsui, 2007). As a 
result, CONC is expected to be negatively related with accrual management. The 
variable is lagged in equation (3.3) and contemporaneous in equation (3.4) 
Per last, the CONTROLS considered are: the lagged market-to-book (MTB) ratio to 
contemplate firms’ growth opportunities; the natural logarithm of the sum of market 
capitalization with preferred stock, minority interests and total debt minus cash, at the 
beginning of the year, proxies for size (SIZE); Return-on-assets is included but it is net 
of accrual management in equation (3.4) and net of total earnings management in 
equation (3.3) (ROA_AM, ROA_EM);  cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total 
assets is included in equation (3.3) to address possible measurement errors. In addition, 
both equations include year indicators and computed are with generalized least squares 
cross-section weights.  
3.6. Tax incentives 
To investigate how both kinds of earnings management and derivatives use impact on 




























Where for year t, and firm i, ETR1 and ETR2 is the ratio between tax expenses and 
pre-tax income 12  or cash flow from operations, respectively. Both variables are 
windsorized at 0. DERIV corresponds to a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is 
using derivatives and 0 otherwise. CONVEX is the excess of the nominal marginal tax 
rate over the effective tax rate. As a result, DERIV*CONVEX equals CONVEX if firms 
hedge and 0 otherwise. AMFLEX is firms’ flexibility to use accrual management and 
RMFLEX is firms’ operational flexibility, which reflects how easily real management 
strategies may be applied. Those variables are measured by the sum squared residuals of 
equations (3.1) and (3.2), respectively. The CONTROLS are mostly based on the study 
of Ribeiro et al. (2015), which is an analysis of the determinants of the effective tax 
rates of non-financial firms, listed on London stock exchange. Two sets of variables are 
employed, namely firm specific as well as non-firm specific characteristics, such as 
governance variables. In the first set, the variables included are capital intensity 
(CAP_INT) that is measured by the ratio between the value of property, plant and 
equipment and total assets and is expected to be negatively associated with effective tax 
rates due to amortizations. In opposite, inventories intensity (INV_INT), measured by 
inventories divided by total assets, is predicted to be positively related with ETRs. A 
dummy variable (LEV_D) that equals 1 if total debt divided by total assets is above 
sample median is incorporated to capture the effect of tax savings related with debt. 
This variable is considered at the beginning of the year. ROA is used to control for firm 
performance, while SIZE and MTB are considered at the beginning of the period to 
control for firm size and growth opportunities, respectively. R&D intensity is probably 
an important determinant, nonetheless, has already highlighted, this information is not 
quantitatively disclosed by most firms. In the second set the variables used insider 
12 The ratio between tax expenses and taxable income is not used because then both the numerator and the 
denominator would be net of the tax adjustments. Thus, the impact of tax preferences on ETRs would 
have been omitted. 
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ownership (INSIDER) and ownership concentration (CONC), both at the beginning of 
the year, and also board size (BOARD). No predictions are done for the impact of these 
variables. BIG4 is included since their clients can also contract non-audit services, such 
as, tax services. Big4 are expected to have extensive knowledge of the tax system and 
induce relevant tax savings. Therefore, this variable is projected to be negatively 
associated with ETRs. The model is estimated with generalized least squares cross-
section weights and time fixed effects.  
To understand if convexity is relevant when firms consider the use of derivatives, the 





















        (3.8) 
Where for each year t and firm i, DERIV and CONVEX are as defined in equation (3.6) 
and (3.7), TLDEBT and STDEBT correspond to long term debt and short term debt, 
respectively. Both variables are scaled by the logarithm of lagged total assets. They 
capture interest rate risk and should be positively associated with hedging. ISALES is 
international sales divided by lagged total sales. It proxies for exchange rate risk and is 
expected to be positively related with derivatives use13. DY corresponds to dividend 
yield which is computed as dividends divided by market capitalization. This variable is 
considered at the beginning of the year. Firms that pay higher amounts of dividends, 
have greater needs for cash, hence, they have additional incentives to use derivatives 
(Graham and Rodgers, 2002). Firms with a lengthier operational cycle, have their 
receivables outstanding for longer periods, which means they are more exposed, for 
example, to market prices variations (Barton, 2001). Therefore, CYCLE (lagged) is 
predicted to be positively associated with hedging. HEALTH (at the beginning of the 
year) is anticipated to be negatively related with hedging, since distressed firms may be 
more sensible to shocks, which encourages the use of derivatives. In addition, according 
13 Portuguese firms are exposed to exchange risk when they make transactions with non-Euro Area (EA) 
countries. Most firms do not disclose sales at a country-level. ISALES are sales from production made 
abroad which should be more closely related with sales to non-EA countries. 
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to Smith and Stulz (1985) firms may hedge to smooth earnings and consequently ease 
creditors’ perception of risk. Bigger boards are supposed to concentrate more 
knowledge and experience, which may ease the use of more complex strategies and 
products. Thus, BOARD is projected to be positively associated with derivatives use. 
Additional controls are MTB and SIZE at the beginning of the year and 
contemporaneous ROA. Those variables account for growth opportunities, firm size and 
performance, respectively. Coefficients are estimated using a Logit with year indicators.  
3.7. Derivatives and earnings management 
The study of how derivatives use influence earnings management decisions is based on 
Barton (2001) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002). However, these researches use 
derivatives notional amounts and study the existence of a simultaneous decision to use 
derivatives and accrual management. The current study differs from these researches 
given the hypothesis presented is that firms make a sequential decision. Firstly, they 
decide about the use of derivatives and secondly on the magnitude of earnings 
management (accrual and real management). It is expected that firms that rely on 
hedging will have smoother earnings and consequently will need to engage in earnings 
management practices to smooth earnings to a lesser extent. To test this hypothesis the 
following model is used: 
ititxxitit CONTROLSDERIVEM   ,,210 **|| (3.9) 
Where for each year t and firm i, |EM| denotes the absolute value of the sum between 
AM and RM. Hence, only the magnitude of earnings management is considered, given 
the theory of earnings management practices and derivatives only holds amid of firms 
with incentives to reduce earnings volatility. All the other variables considered are 
CONTROLS. Lagged HEALTH is included to control for financial distress and lagged 
CYCLE to consider operational risks. If a bigger BOARD eases the use of derivatives, 
then this variable should be negatively related with the absolute value of total earnings 
management. CONVEX is included to control for tax incentives to smooth earnings. 
According to Barton (2001), managers can maintain firms’ dividend payout rates and 
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still pay fewer dividends by reducing earnings. Thus, dividend payout (PAYOUT), 
measured by the ratio between dividends and pre-managed earnings, is anticipated to be 
negatively related with absolute earnings management.  Investors would probably 
require a risk premium if leveraged firms do not formally manage interest risk, even if 
firms present relatively stable earnings, as a result of earnings management schemes. 
Therefore, leveraged firms (LEV_D) should rely more on derivatives and less on 
earnings management. AM_FLEX and RM_FLEX are included because these variables 
control for measurement error in earnings management estimations, incorporate firm 
specific characteristics and proxy for operational flexibility to use each kind of earnings 
management. The absolute value of CFO (|CFO|) is used to control for measurement 
error. ROA_EM controls for firm performance whereas MTB and SIZE, at the beginning 
of the year, are considered to incorporate firms’ growth opportunities and size, 
respectively. The model is estimated with generalized least squares cross-section 
weights and time fixed effects. 
3.8. Financial and market Incentives 
To test if firms manage earnings in response to financial and market incentives, the 













   (3.10) 
Where for year t and firm i, EM is the sum of AM and RM. This variable equals 1 if an 
observation is on the top quartile of a sample that includes only firm-years with positive 
values in LTDEBT and 0 in all other cases. CREDIT is the first difference of an index of 
banks terms and conditions when lending to enterprises in Portugal. It is based on the 
qualitative data from Bank Lending Survey. To construct the index, the series are 
rescaled to set mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to 114. Then, principal 
components analysis is used to construct a single series that summarizes the information 
content. Subsequently, this single series is rescaled so that its mean equals 100 and the 
14 This is to ensure that principal components outcome is not influenced by measurement units. 
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standard deviation equals 10. Since the frequency of the data is quarterly, 4 quarters 
moving averages are applied and the value obtained for the last quarter of each year is 
used. The series included in the index refer to the balance of responses of Portuguese 
main banks on the following questions regarding banks’ terms and conditions: Your 
bank’s loan margin on average loans; Your bank’s loan margin on riskier loans; Non-
interest rate charges; Size of the loan or credit line; Collateral requirements; Loan 
covenants; Maturity. Overall, BORROWERS*CREDIT equals the evolution of banks 
terms and conditions if there is a relevant increase in long term debt and 0 otherwise. 
SMOOTHERS correspond to a dummy variable that equals 1 if firms’ return on assets is 
between 0 and 0.01 (0 otherwise), which happens for 53 observations. BEATERS equals 
1 if change in earnings per share is between 0 and 2 cents (0 otherwise) and this occurs 
for 35 firm-years. DIVID equals 1 if pre-managed earnings are below dividends payed 
in the previous year and the firm pays dividends in the current year, 0 otherwise. 
CONTRAINTS corresponds to a variable that ranges from 0 to 6, and is the sum of 6 
dummy variables that are supposed to capture circumstances in which it is harder for 
firms to manage earnings. Thus, CONTRAINTS sums 1 if the length of the operational 
cycle, or the ZSCORE from Altman modified model (1968, 2000), are in the first 
quartile of the sample. CONTRAINTS also sums 1 if insider ownership and net 
operating assets are in the top quartile in the beginning of the year. The other criteria 
equal BIG4 and CONC. A top/bottom quartile approach is used, since firm-years 
observations in the top/bottom quartiles are the ones expected to be significantly and 
effectively restricted. CONTROLS are ROA_EM, MTB, LEV (total debt divided by total 
assets) and SIZE to account for firms’ performance, growth opportunities, leverage, and 
size, respectively. The model is estimated with generalized least squares cross-section 
weights and time fixed effects. 
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4. Results
4.1. Accrual-based management vs real activities-based management 






CONSTANT 0.0993*** -0.1234*** 
INSIDERt-1/t - -0.0055** + 0.0014 
MTRt - -0.0028*** + 0.0035*** 
HEALTHt-1/t + -0.0121*** - 0.0081*** 
BOARDt - -6.7272 + 160.0484* 
BIG4t + 0.0014 - -0.0048* 
CYCLEt-1/t - 0.0084*** + 0.0026 
NOAt + 0.0017 - 0.0012 
CONCt-1/t + -0.0023 - -0.0025 
SIZEt-1 ? -0.0029*** ? 0.0017* 
MTBt-1 ? -0.0018*** ? 0.0013** 
ROA_EM t - -0.1051*** 
ROA_AMt - -0.1784*** 
CFOt + 0.4354*** 
RMt - -0.6185*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5281 0.5941 
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 
DW Stat 1.8894 1.8634 
Total panel obs. 307 306 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 
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The results (Table 2) point that insider ownership (INSIDER) acts mostly as a real 
management constraint, still it is positively related with accrual management. This 
indicates that when executives have a relevant fraction of the firms’ stock, they prefer 
not to engage in practices that may affect their future wealth and is in accordance with 
the agency theory. The signal and significance of the coefficients for MTR are 
consistent with accrual management being more desirable from a tax-based standpoint. 
When managing earnings upward, through accrual management, firms may not affect 
tax expenses or be able to defer additional costs. The results point that firms with lower 
HEALTH are more likely to use real management stratagems, which is the opposite to 
the predictions presented. Firstly, it is important enhance that the variable HEALTH 
does not differentiate firms in financial distress from others. It actually compares the 
50% better with the 50% worst. The outcome hints that firms with lower HEALTH are 
more motivated to increase cash resources than just to report higher earnings. For 
example, if a firm is closer to be in distress, then it may be more interested in making 
sales in which receivables will be outstanding for shorter periods, giving its clients less 
time to pay, at the cost of a lower turnover. Interestingly, boards with more directors 
(BOARD) are associated with accrual-based strategies. This hints that an increase in the 
number of directors may lead to an increase in bureaucracy, which diminishes directors’ 
monitoring abilities, generating space for accrual-based approaches. One should 
highlight that more directors do not meaningfully imply less real management, just 
more accrual management. Thus, the evidence suggests that from an earnings 
management perspective, on average, more directors do not entail better monitoring. It 
was projected that firms with lengthier operational cycles (CYCLE) would have more 
space to engage in accrual management. Nonetheless, it also stimulates real 
management, according to the results obtained. Still, firms with lengthier operational 
cycles, such as firms from the real-estate sector, may have more volatile cash-flows and 
as a result, being associated with higher levels of earnings management1. As expected 
Big4’ clients have lower levels of discretionary accruals, that is, rely more in 
accounting-based strategies. Moreover, this variable relates positively with real 
management. Net operating assets (NOA), does not relate with earnings management in 
the way it was anticipated. Nevertheless, the variable is not statistically relevant in both 
1 This highlights the relevance of Dechow et al. (2012) methodology to assess earnings quality. 
27 
equations, amid of the specification design presented2. Per last, the purpose of equations 
(3.3) and (3.4) was to test the existence of a trade-off between accrual and real 
activities-based management (H1). In fact, the coefficient of RM in equation (3.4) is 
negative, which confirms H1, at 99% confidence level. As a robustness check, AM and 
RM were transformed in dummy variables (AM_D and RM_D) that equal 1 if accrual or 
real management are positive (0 otherwise), respectively. In this scenario, H1 is still 
confirmed. The model was also re-estimated with robust least squares to check if 
measurement errors in the endogenous variables could be driving the main results. The 
conclusions hold both qualitatively and quantitatively. Tough, these results do not imply 
that there is not also a simultaneous decision process. Probably, both dynamics play a 
role. However, managers are likely to prefer to firstly use real management while being 
able to apply accrual management strategies if necessary. Overall, the results show the 
relevance of considering both strategies in subsequent researches. Moreover, regulation 
that restrains accounting-based strategies may be compensated for more intensive real-
management strategies.  
4.2. Tax incentives 
Table 3: Estimation results of equations (3.6) and (3.7) 
Predicted sign ETR1 ETR2 
CONSTANT 0.1695*** 0.0006 
CAP_INTt - -0.0793*** -0.0598* 
INV_INTt + -0.0584 0.0604 
LEV_Dt-1 - -0.0219*** -0.0329*** 
INSIDER t-1 + 0.0004 -0.0283** 
CONC t-1 + 0.0063 0.0348*** 
BOARDt - -361.22 -1227.1*** 
BIG4t - 0.0109 -0.0452*** 
ROAt + 0.1864** 0.4596*** 
2 In untabulated results, it was possible to confirm EM is negatively related with a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if net operating assets are on the top quartile (0 otherwise). This implies that net operating assets 
acts as an earnings management constraint only when net operating assets are significantly overvalued.    
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SIZEt-1 + 0.0059** 0.0129*** 
MTBt-1 + 0.0021 7.32E-5 
AM_FLEXt ? -0.6959*** 0.6422** 
RM_FLEXt ? 1.3171*** 0.5878 
CONVEXt*DERIVt - -0.0080*** -0.0034*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8146 0.2189 
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 
DW Stat 1.2234 1.3319 
Total panel obs. 342 342 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 
According to the results presented in Table 4, capital intensive (CAP_INT) firms have 
lower effective tax rates. Nevertheless, this variable is less relevant when tax expenses 
are consider as proportion of cash-flow from operations. INV_INT relates differently in 
the two equations, while not statistically significant in none of them. This outcome may 
be the result of not considering expenses related with research and development. 
Leverage (LEV_D) is negatively associated with effective tax rates in both equations, 
which translates tax savings related with indebtedness. As expected, profitability (ROA) 
relates positively with ETRs. These results are also consistent with bigger firms facing 
political costs that can be perceived through the tax system, since SIZE’s coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant in both equations. Interestingly, it is possible to 
verify that when tax expenses are measured as a proportion of pre-tax income, non-firm 
specific characteristics (BOARD, CONC, INSIDER, and BIG4) are not statistically 
relevant. However, they appear to play an important role when cash ETR is used 
(ETR2)3. This may be indicating that firms are primarily concerned with the impact of 
taxation on their cash resources. The results point that, at 99% confidence level, boards 
with more directors are able to soft cash ETRs. In addition, firms in which no 
shareholder has a large influence (CONC), tend to have higher cash ETRs. This suggests 
that in those circumstances, managers are less likely to be compelled by shareholders to 
3 By using the cash-flow from operations as denominator when computing ETRs, one can control for 
differences that arise from the use of different accounting methods.   
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engage in tax management or that minority shareholders have less incentives to monitor 
management’s efficiency. In opposite, firms in which insiders have higher ownership 
(INSIDER) have lower cash ETRs (ETR2). This is consistent with managers being 
motivated to reduce taxation impact on firms’ cash when they are more relevant owners, 
directly benefiting from the reduction of tax expenses. Overall, the impact of BOARD, 
CONC and INSIDER on cash ETR is in line with the results of Ribeiro et al. (2015) 
when studying firms listed on the London stock exchange. As projected, by providing 
tax services, Big4s can induce relevant tax savings. On average, Big4s are able to 
reduce their clients cash ETRs by 4.5%. It could be important for the Tax Authority to 
understand how this is achieved, that is, how BIG4’ clients were being benefited. 
RM_FLEX is positively related with both measures of effective tax rates, which points 
that when managing earnings through real activities, firms are usually not motivated by 
tax incentives. The interpretation of the coefficient of AM_FLEX is not that clear, since 
the variable is statistically significant in both equations but with opposite signs. 
Therefore, it is not possible to conclude if firms engage in accrual management 
strategies with the purpose of paying fewer taxes. Per last, the coefficient of 
CONVEX*DERIV is negative and statistically significant (99% confidence level) in 
both equations. This shows that as the tax function becomes more convex, tax savings 
related with the use of derivatives increase, as suggested by Smith and Stulz (1985). If 
DERIV and CONVEX are included in the equation separately, that is, by not making an 
interaction between them, none of the two has a statistical relevant explanatory power. 
In other words, according to the results, firms can directly4 reduce tax expenses by 
hedging, if the tax function is convex (H2). 
4 As an example, firms can indirectly reduce tax expenses with derivatives by reducing risk due to the 
reduction in the volatility of cash-flows. This way, firms are able to reduce the probability of bankruptcy. 
As a result, firms may reduce the cost of capital and increase debt capacity, generating tax savings related 
with indebtedness (Graham, and Rodgers, 2002). 
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Table 4: Estimation results of equation (3.8) 
Predicted sign DERIV 
Coefficients Marginal effects 
CONSTANT -4.9852 -1.9888 
LTDEBTt + 2.45E-5*** 9.76E-6 
STDEBTt - -2.24E-5 8.94E-6 
ISALESt + 0.9719* 0.3874 
HEALTHt-1 - 1.1060*** 0.4412 
CYCLEt-1 + 0.8474** 0.3381 
BOARDt + -30190* -12044 
DYt-1 + 9.8936** 3.9470 
ROAt ? 3.6622 1.4610 
SIZEt-1 ? 0.1525 0.0609 
MTBt-1 ? 0.1710** 0.0682 
CONVEXt-1 + 0.0204** 0.0082 
Year dummies Yes 
McFadden R-squared 0.3982 
Prob (LR stat) 0.0000 
Obs. correctly predicted 83.11% 
Total panel obs. 296 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 
If firms can reduce tax expenses by hedging with derivatives, when the tax function is 
convex, one shall analyse if firms hedge due to tax convexity. That is the purpose of 
estimating equation (3.8). Table 5 shows firms’ probability to use derivatives increases 
with long term debt (LTDEBT). This implies that firms’, during the sample period, have 
been concerned with interest rate risk. In addition, international sales (ISALES) are 
positively related with hedging, which is consistent with firms managing exchange rate 
risk. Strangely, healthier firms are the ones more likely to hedge with derivatives and 
HEALTH’s coefficient is statistically significant at 99% confidence level. From a 
theoretically point of view, the more distressed firms would be the ones expected to 
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hedge, because they are more sensible to shocks and by hedging, they could diminish 
bankruptcy probability. In addition, by hedging those firms could smooth earnings and 
consequently creditors’ perception of risk. The results may, however, be linked with 
transaction costs associated with these instruments and with the existence of alternative 
strategies to smooth earnings, which might be less costly. Indeed, firms may smooth 
earnings through earnings management strategies (this will be discussed later, Table 5). 
As projected, firms with lengthier operational cycles (CYCLE), face more risks, thus, 
hedge more. The variable BOARD relates negatively with hedging, which is opposite to 
the predictions. That implies that the effect of additional experience and knowledge on 
the board is more than compensated by the increase in bureaucracy and in difficulties to 
approve complex decisions. Nonetheless, once more, one should highlight that there 
may be other procedures to reduce earnings volatility. The results presented in Table 2, 
indicated that firms with more directors on the boards tend to use more accrual 
management. Besides, the correlation between BOARD and both AM_FLEX and 
RM_FLEX, is significant and positive (see Annex, Table 11). Overall, the signal of the 
coefficients of the variables HEALTH and BOARD demonstrate the importance of 
studying the existence of a trade-off between earnings management and hedging 
policies. The results obtained show firms that pay higher dividends (DY), tend to use 
derivatives. Those firms need to maintain higher levels of cash, so they can pay higher 
dividends. They are probably hedging to safeguard that their cash resources do not fall 
short of dividend payments. The importance of paying expected dividends is also 
discussed later (Table 6). Finally, the main purpose of the regression was to understand 
if hedging policies were responsive to tax convexity. At 95% confidence level, H3 is 
confirmed. An increase of one percentage point in convexity increases the probability of 
derivatives use by 0.8%5. Overall, the results point that firms consider tax convexity 
when deciding to hedge. Furthermore, the model appears to be reliable given it correctly 
classifies firms-years as hedgers or non-hedgers 83.11% of the time. 
5 Marginal effects are computed at the mean. 
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4.3. Derivatives and earnings management 
Table 5: Estimation results of equation (3.9) 
Predicted sign |EM| 
C 0.0261** 
HEALTHt-1 - -0.0025 
CYCLEt-1 - -0.0017 
BOARDt - -201.8** 
PAYOUTt - -0.0002 
CONVEXt + 8.58E-5* 
LEV_Dt-1 - -0.0029** 
AM_FLEXt + 0.3324*** 
RM_FLEXt + 0.2161** 
ROA_EMt - -0.0566*** 
MTBt-1 ? 0.0004 
SIZEt-1 - -0.0003 
|CFO|t + 0.0036 
DERIVt - -0.0076*** 
Year dummies Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5256 
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 
DW Stat 2.0317 
Total panel obs. 299 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 
Table 6 should be examined together with Table 5, because it is expected that firms first 
decide on the use of derivatives and then adjust earnings management strategies to 
smooth earnings. Therefore, equation (3.8) (Table 5) represents the first step of the 
decision making process and equation (3.9) (Table 6) the second one. If taken together, 
the results in Table 5 and 6 suggest the more distressed firms are more likely to manage 
earnings to smooth reported income than to use derivatives, which may be explained, 
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for example, by distressed firms’ disability to pay transaction costs. BOARD is 
statistically relevant, but negatively associated with smoothing practices, whether based 
on earnings management or derivatives, that is, crowded BOARDs are less likely to use 
strategies to smooth earnings, whether through earnings management engagements or 
by hedging with derivatives. This hints the existence of limitations related with more 
populated boards. Furthermore, this does not appear to be the result of better monitoring 
because BOARD is positively associated with accrual management practices to increase 
earnings (Table 2). The more leveraged firms (LEV_D) hedge more. As a result, they 
rely less in earnings management practices to reduce earnings volatility. In addition, as 
expected, tax convexity (CONVEX) is positively associated with earnings management 
practices to smooth earnings. Intuitively, firms able to manage earnings, whether 
through accruals (AM_FLEX) or real activities (RM_FLEX), tend to use more these 
strategies to smooth reported income. The main purpose of this analysis was to test the 
hypothesis that when firms use derivatives, they are likely to have smoother earnings, 
and consequently, will need to manage earnings to a lesser extent, with the objective of 
smoothing reported income (H6). DERIV is statistically relevant (at 99% confidence 
level), which implies that, when firms use derivatives, on average, total absolute 
earnings management, measured as a proportion of total assets (at the beginning of the 
year), decline by 0.7 percent. Still, it would be rather normal that, due to higher 
volatility, non-hedging firms have more abnormal accruals or cash-flows. Nevertheless, 
in the estimations, |CFO| and ROA_EM should already be controlling for that. 
Likewise, if a dynamic approach is employed, that is, when the lagged value of |EM| is 
included as an explanatory variable the results do not change meaningfully.  
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4.4. Financial and market incentives 
Table 6: Estimation results of equation (3.10) 
Predicted Sign      EM 
CONSTANT -0.0028* 
ROA_EMt - -0.3079*** 
CFO_RMt - 0.0505 
LEVt-1 - -0.0262*** 
SIZEt-1 - 0.0017** 
MTBt-1 ? 0.0008 
CONSTRAINTSt - -0.0032*** 
BEATERSt + -0.0016 
SMOTHERSt + -0.0055* 
BORROWERSt*CREDITt + 0.0006** 
DIVIDt + 0.0108*** 
Year dummies Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.2808 
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 
DW Statistic 1.7789 
Total panel obs. 300 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; 
Equation (3.10) was estimated (Table 6) with the purpose of answering the question: 
why firms manage earnings upward? First of all, the variable CONSTRAINTS appears to 
be effectively capturing earnings management restrictions. Its coefficient is negative 
and the variable is statistically significant at 99% confidence level. Ceteirs paribus, the 
difference in total earnings management between a non-constrained and a full 
constrained firm equals on average, 1.92% of total assets. Controlling for earnings 
management constraints is of first importance, since firms with specific motivations to 
manage earnings may not be able to do it because they are in some way restrained. This 
should increase the power of the tests. The most typical market incentives to manage 
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earnings, proxied in this case by BEATERS and SMOOTHERS appear not to be of first 
relevance for Portuguese listed firms. This study does not present evidence of firms 
managing earnings to avoid losses or earnings decreases6. The results presented show 
that firms with higher increases in long term debt, manage earnings upward in response 
to an increase in banks terms and conditions. This is consistent with firms minimizing 
the cost of capital through earnings management. On average, when those firms 
celebrate new debt contracts, an increase of one standard deviation in banks terms and 
conditions leads to an increase in earnings management of 0.6% of total assets. If the 
variables BORROWERS and CREDIT are included separately, they do not appear to be 
important from a statistical point of view. In other words, firms manage earnings to 
increase the cost of capital if financial conditions get worse, that is, when the marginal 
benefit of managing earnings increases. The variable BORROWERS equals 1 if the 
increase in long-term debt is on the top quartile (within firms with increases in long-
term debt) and 0 otherwise. If the observations on the third quartile are also set to equal 
one, then the coefficient of the variable BORROWERS*CREDIT becomes less 
significant. In this sense, the results are methodology sensitive. Theoretically, this may 
just be pointing, again, to the idea that firms risk to manage earnings upward only when 
they can significantly benefit from it, in this case, when the amount of credit obtained is 
high enough. Still, the main incentive for firms to manage earnings seems to be the 
payment of expected dividends, since DIVID is statistically significant at 99% 
confidence level. The results suggest that when earnings are falling short of the 
dividends payed in the previous year, firms on average manage earnings upward by 
1.08% of total assets. This outcome is in accordance with the literature that highlights 
the importance of dividends to shareholders. This is also consistent with the results of 
Naveen et al. (2008) when studying Standard & Poor’s 1500 firms. Overall, the results 
presented are robust because both kinds of earnings management are considered; most 
studies focus only in only one incentive while this investigation incorporates different 
ones; this study has a complete measure of earnings management constraints, whereas 
6 As a robustness check, the variable beaters was set to equal to 1 if the variation in earnings per share is 
between 0 and 1 cent while smoothers was computed to equal 1 if return on assets was above 0 and lower 
than half percent. Both variables were set to 0 in all other cases. In this scenario, the signal of the 
coefficient of those variables is still negative, even if not statistically significant.  
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other researches do not control for this restrictions or just use a reduced number of 
specific control variables as robustness checks.   
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5. Conclusion
This research aims at filling a gap in the literature for Portugal, concerning earnings 
management, by providing a comprehensive and wide study. In fact, focusing the 
research in Portugal brought some difficulties that needed to be addressed. A relevant 
issue was the existence of a reduced number of firms. Moreover, those firms are 
scattered by different industries. These are structural characteristic of Portuguese capital 
markets. Hence, firm-level estimations were applied, which was possible because there 
was for most firms ten years of data since the adoption of IFRS. Overall, firm-level 
estimations have advantages and disadvantages and researchers might consider a 
procedure that incorporates the benefits of both industry-year and firm-level 
estimations. Still, the most important point may be that, from now on, there is a 
defensible standard framework that Portuguese institutions and researchers may use and 
develop. 
This study provided evidence that accrual and real management strategies are 
substitutes, which is in line with the results obtained by Zang (2011). The underlying 
implication of this is that proxying earnings management exclusively with abnormal 
accruals is likely to weaken the power of tests. Therefore, researchers should use a more 
complete measure of earnings management. The results presented also suggest that as 
the marginal tax rate increases, managers prefer to trade real for accrual management. 
This hints that when managing earnings upward through accrual management, firms can 
more easily soft the increase in the tax expenses. Healthier firms also appear to prefer to 
rely on accrual management, whereas firms with lengthier operational cycles use more 
real management. 
Using the work of Barton (2001) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) as benchmarks, it was 
possible to present evidence consistent with firms that use financial derivatives 
managing earnings, to smooth reported income, in lesser magnitudes. Moreover, if 
increases in pre-tax income lead to each time smaller increases in net income firms can 
reduce tax expenses if they hedge with derivatives. This is the first research to validate 
this empirically. Theoretically, they would also be able to do this with earnings 
management approaches; even so, this research fails to provide evidence of that.  
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Per last, it was presented evidence that firms manage earnings upward to meet dividend 
thresholds, as in Naveen et al. (2008). The results also suggested, though not so 
meaningfully, that firms manage earnings upward to decrease the cost of capital. 
This investigation was designed to test a total of ten hypotheses. It was not possible to 
confirm four of them (H4, H5, H7, H8). Indeed, this study does to confirm that firms 
reporting low earnings (H7) and small earnings increases (H8) are more likely to be 
managing earnings upward, even after an alternative specification for the proxies used. 
Nevertheless, the literature concerning earnings management, assumed frequently that 
those were primary motivations for firms to manage earnings upward.  This underlines 
the importance of focusing the study in Portugal, providing a better understanding of the 
specific drivers of Portuguese listed firms regarding earrings management.  
In H4 and H5 it was suggested that accrual and real management practices had an 
impact on effective tax rates. Although, some indications that earnings management 
relates with ETRs were provided, this relation was not meaningfully clarified. Hence, 
there is clearly space for improvements in future researches, mainly in the methodology. 
Still, this is one more step to comprehend this dimension of earnings management and 












Ahmed, H., Azevedo, A., and Y. Guney (2010), “The Effect of Hedging on Firm Value 
and Performance: Evidence from the Nonfinancial UK Firms”, Research - Working 
Paper, Hull University Business School.  
Allayannis, G. and E. Ofek (2001), “Exchange rate exposure, hedging, and the use of 
foreign currency derivatives”, Journal of international money and finance, Vol. 20, Nº2, 
pp. 273-296.  
Allayannis, G., U. Lel and D. Miller (2012), “The use of foreign currency derivatives, 
corporate governance, and firm value around the world”, Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 87, Nº1, pp. 65-79.  
Altman, E. (1968), “Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcy”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, Nº4, pp. 589-609.  
Altman, E. (2000), “Predicting financial distress of companies: revisiting the Z-score 
and ZETA models”, Stern School of Business, New York University, pp. 9-12.  
Alves, S. (2012), “Ownership structure and earnings management: Evidence from 
Portugal”, Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, Vol. 6, Nº1, pp. 57-
74. 
Alves, S. (2011), “The effect of the board structure on earnings management: evidence 
from Portugal”, Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Vol. 9, Nº2, 141-160. 
Alworth, J. (1998), “Taxation and integrated financial markets: the challenges of 
derivatives and Other Financial Innovations”, International Tax and Public 
Finance, Vol. 5, Nº4, pp. 507-534.  
Angelopoulou, E., H. Balfoussia and H. Gibson (2014), “Building a financial conditions 
index for the euro area and selected euro area countries: what does it tell us about the 
crisis?”, Economic Modelling, Vol. 38, pp. 392-403. 
40 
Armstrong, C., J. Blouin and D. Larcker (2012), “The incentives for tax 
planning”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 53, Nº1, pp. 391-411.  
Baber, W., P. Fairfield and J. Haggard (1991) “The effect of concern about reported 
income on discretionary spending decisions: The case of research and 
development”, The Accounting Review, pp. 818-829.  
Ball, R. and L. Shivakumar (2006), “The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain 
and loss recognition”, Journal of accounting research, Vol. 44, Nº2, pp. 207-242.  
Barton, J. and P. Simko (2002), “The balance sheet as an earnings management 
constraint”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 77, Nº1, pp. 1-27.  
Barton, J. (2001), “Does the use of financial derivatives affect earnings management 
decisions?”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 76, Nº1, pp. 1-26. 
Bartram, S., G. Brown, and J. Conrad (2011), “The effects of derivatives on firm risk 
and value”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 46, Nº4, pp. 967-999.  
Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo and K. Subramanyam (1998), “The effect of audit 
quality on earnings management”, Contemporary accounting research, Vol. 15, Nº1, 
pp. 1-24.  
Bens, D., V. Nagar and M. H. Wong (2002), “Real investment implications of employee 
stock option exercises”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, Nº2, pp. 359-393.  
Bhattacharya, U., H. Daouk and M. Welker (2003), “The world price of earnings 
opacity”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 78, Nº3, pp. 641-678.  
Biddle, G. C. (1980), “Accounting methods and management decisions: The case of 
inventory costing and inventory policy”, Journal of Accounting Research, pp. 235-280.  
Bowen, R. M., E. W. Noreen and J. M. Lacey (1981), “Determinants of the corporate 
decision to capitalize interest”, Journal of accounting and economics, Vol. 3, Nº2, pp. 
151-179.  
41 
Bradley, M. and M. R. Roberts (2004), “The structure and pricing of corporate debt 
covenants”, 6th Annual Texas Finance Festival.  
Brandão, E., A. Cerqueira, and A. Ribeiro (2015), "The determinants of effective tax 
rates: Firms’ characteristics and corporate governance", Research – Work in Progress, 
Nº 567, School of Management and Economics, University of Porto. 
Brandão, E., A. Cerqueira, and M. Nova (2015), "Hedging with derivatives and firm 
value", Research – Work in Progress, Nº 568, School of Management and Economics, 
University of Porto. 
Brav, A., J., R. Graham, C. R. Harvey and R. Michaely (2005), “Payout policy in the 
21st century”, Journal of financial economics, Vol. 77, Nº3, pp. 483-527.  
Brockman, P. and E. Unlu (2009), “Dividend policy, creditor rights, and the agency 
costs of debt”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 92, Nº2, pp. 276-299.  
Burgstahler, D. and I. Dichev (1997), “Earnings management to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses”, Journal of accounting and economics, Vol. 24, Nº1, pp. 99-126.  
Bushee, B. J. (1998), “Institutional investors, long-term investment, and earnings 
management” Long-term Investment, And Earnings Management (January 1998).  
Ching, K. M., M. Firth, and O. M. Rui (2006), “Earnings management, corporate 
governance and the market performance of seasoned equity offerings in Hong 
Kong”, Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, Vol. 2, Nº1, pp. 73-98.  
Choi, J. H., K. A. Jeon and J. I. Park (2004), “The role of audit committees in 
decreasing earnings management: Korean evidence”, International Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Vol. 1, Nº1, 37-60.  
Christensen, H. B., E. Lee, M. Walker, and C. Zeng (2015), “Incentives or standards: 
What determines accounting quality changes around IFRS adoption?”, European 
Accounting Review, Vol. 24, Nº1, pp. 31-61.  
42 
Cohen, D. A., A. Dey and T. Z. Lys (2008), “Real and accrual-based earnings 
management in the pre-and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 
83, Nº3, pp 757-787.  
Cohen, D. and P. Zarowin (2008), “Economic consequences of real and accrual-based 
earnings management activities”, Leonard Ster School of Business & New York 
University, Working Paper. 
Cornett, M. M., A. J. Marcus and H. Tehranian (2008), “Corporate governance and pay-
for-performance: The impact of earnings management”, Journal of financial 
economics, Vol. 87, Nº2, pp. 357-373.  
Daniel, N. D., D. J. Denis, and L. Naveen (2008), “Do firms manage earnings to meet 
dividend thresholds?” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 45, Nº1, pp. 2-26. 
DeAngelo, H. and L. DeAngelo (2006), “The irrelevance of the MM dividend 
irrelevance theorem”, Journal of financial economics, Vol. 79, Nº2, pp. 293-315.  
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo and R. M. Stulz (2006), “Dividend policy and the 
earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory”, Journal of Financial 
economics, Vol. 81, Nº2, 227-254.  
Dechow, P. M., A. P. Hutton, J. H. Kim and R. G. Sloan (2012), “Detecting earnings 
management: A new approach”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 50, Nº2, pp. 275-
334. 
Dechow, P. M. (1994), “Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm 
performance: The role of accounting accruals”, Journal of accounting and 
economics, Vol. 18, Nº1, pp. 3-42.  
Dechow, P. M. and D. J. Skinner (2000), “Earnings management: Reconciling the views 
of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators”, Accounting horizons, Vol. 14, 
Nº2, pp. 235-250.  
43 
Dechow, P. M., I. D. Dichev (2002), “The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of 
accrual estimation errors”, The accounting review, Vol. 77, Nº1, pp. 35-59.  
Dechow, P. M. and R. G. Sloan (1991), “Executive incentives and the horizon problem: 
An empirical investigation”, Journal of accounting and Economics, Vol. 14, Nº1, pp. 
51-89.  
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan and A. P. Sweeney (1995), “Detecting earnings 
management”, The Accounting Review, pp. 193-225.  
Dechow, P. M., S. A. Richardson and I. Tuna (2003), “Why are earnings kinky? An 
examination of the earnings management explanation”, Review of accounting 
studies, Vol. 8, Nº2-3, 355-384.  
Dechow, P., W. Ge and C. Schrand (2010), “Understanding earnings quality: A review 
of the proxies, their determinants and their consequence”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 50, Nº2, pp. 344-401.  
Desai, M. A. (2005), “The degradation of reported corporate profits”, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19, Nº4, pp. 171-192. 
Donaldson, G. (1961), “Corporate debt capacity”. 
Donohoe, M. P. (2015), “The economic effects of financial derivatives on corporate tax 
avoidance”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 59, Nº1, pp. 1-24.  
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon and E. L. Maydew (2008), “Long-run corporate tax 
avoidance”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 83, Nº1, pp. 61-82.  
Dyreng, S. D., M. Hanlon and E. L. Maydew (2010), “The effects of executives on 
corporate tax avoidance”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 85, Nº4, pp. 1163-1189.  
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), “Two agency-cost explanations of dividends”, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 74, Nº4, pp. 650-659.  
44 
Eckel, N. (1981), “The income smoothing hypothesis revisited”, Abacus, Vol. 17, Nº1, 
pp. 28-40.  
Francis, J. R., E. L. Maydew and H. C. Sparks (1999), “The role of Big 6 auditors in the 
credible reporting of accruals”, Auditing: a Journal of Practice & theory, Vol. 18, Nº2, 
pp. 17-34.  
Gao, L. and J. H. Zhang (2015), “Firms’ earnings smoothing, corporate social 
responsibility, and valuation”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.32, pp. 108-127.  
Géczy, C., B. A. Minton and C. Schrand (1997), “Why firms use currency 
derivatives”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, Nº 4, pp. 1323-1354.  
Graham, J. R. (2003), “Taxes and corporate finance: A review”, Review of Financial 
studies, Vol. 16, Nº4, pp. 1075-1129.  
Graham, J. R. and C. W. Smith (1999) “Tax incentives to hedge”, The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 54, Nº6, pp. 2241-2262.  
Graham, J. R. and D. A. Rogers (2002), “Do firms hedge in response to tax 
incentives?”, The Journal of finance, Vol. 57, Nº2, pp. 815-839.  
Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey and S. Rajgopal (2005), “The economic implications of 
corporate financial reporting”, Journal of accounting and economics, Vol. 40, Nº1, pp. 
3-73.  
Grullon, G. and R. Michaely (2002), “Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution 
hypothesis”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, Nº4, pp. 1649-1684.  
Gupta, S. and K. Newberry (1997), “Determinants of the variability in corporate 
effective tax rates: Evidence from longitudinal data”, Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, Vol. 16, Nº1, pp. 1-34.  
Hayn, C. (1995), “The information content of losses”, Journal of accounting and 
economics, Vol. 20, Nº2, pp.125-153.  
45 
Healy, P. M. (1985), “The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions”, Journal of 
accounting and economics, Vol. 7, Nº1, pp. 85-107.  
Healy, P. M. and J. M. Wahlen (1999), “A review of the earnings management literature 
and its implications for standard setting”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 13, Nº4, pp. 365-
383. 
Jaggi, B. and J. Tsui (2007), “Insider trading, earnings management and corporate 
governance: empirical evidence based on Hong Kong firms”, Journal of International 
Financial Management & Accounting, Vol. 18. Nº3, pp. 192-222.  
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of financial economics, Vol. 3, Nº4, pp. 
305-360.  
Jensen, M. C. (1993), “The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, Nº3, pp. 831-880.  
Jones, J. (1991), “Earnings management during import relief investigations”, Journal of 
accounting research, pp. 193-228.  
Jung, B., N. Soderstrom and Y. S. Yang (2013), “Earnings smoothing activities of firms 
to manage credit ratings”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 30, Nº2, pp. 645-
676. 
Kalay, A. (1982), “Stockholder-bondholder conflict and dividend constraints”, Journal 
of financial economics, Vol. 10, Nº2, pp. 211-233.  
Kinney, W. R. and L. S. McDaniel (1989), “Characteristics of firms correcting 
previously reported quarterly earnings”, Journal of accounting and economics, Vol. 11, 
Nº1, pp. 71-93.  
Kirschenheiter, M. and N. D. Melumad (2002), “Can “Big Bath” and Earnings 
Smoothing Co‐exist as Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies?”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 40, Nº3, pp. 761-796.  
46 
Kothari, S. P., N. Mizik S. Roychowdhury (2012), “Managing for the moment: The role 
of real activity versus accruals earnings management in SEO valuation, Research in 
Progress.  
Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone and C. E. Wasley (2005), “Performance matched 
discretionary accrual measures”, Journal of accounting and economics, Vol. 39, Nº1, 
pp. 163-197.  
Kraft, A. (2014), “What Really Affects German Firms' Effective Tax Rate?”, 
International Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 5, Nº3, pp. 1-19. 
Lawrence, A., M. Minutti-Meza and P. Zhang (2011), “Can Big 4 versus non-Big 4 
differences in audit-quality proxies be attributed to client characteristics?”, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 86, Nº1, pp. 259-286.  
Lintner, J. (1956). “Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained 
earnings, and taxes”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 46, Nº2, pp. 97-113.  
Mather, P. and A. Ramsay (2006), “The effects of board characteristics on earnings 
management around Australian CEO changes”, Accounting Research Journal, Vol. 19, 
Nº2, 78-93.  
McNichols, M. F. (2002), “Discussion of the quality of accruals and earnings: 
multiples”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, pp. 135-172.  
Mendes, C. A. and L. L. Rodrigues (2006), “Estudo de práticas de earnings 
management nas empresas portuguesas cotadas em bolsa: Identificação de alisamento 
de resultados e seus factores explicativos”, Tékhne-Revista de Estudos Politécnicos, 
Vol. 5-6, pp. 145-173.  
Minnick, K. and T. Noga (2010), “Do corporate governance characteristics influence 
tax management?”, Journal of corporate finance, Vol. 16, Nº5, pp. 703-718. 
Myers, S. C. (1984), “The capital structure puzzle”, The journal of finance, Vol. 39, 
Nº3, pp. 574-592.  
47 
Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf (1984), “Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have”, Journal of financial 
economics, Vol. 13, Nº2, pp. 187-221.  
Nance, D. R., C. W. Smith and C. W. Smithson (1993), “On the determinants of 
corporate hedging”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, Nº1, pp. 267-284.  
Healy, P. M. and K. G. Palepu (2012). Business Analysis Valuation: Using Financial 
Statements. Cengage Learning. 
Pincus, M. and S. Rajgopal (2002), “The interaction between accrual management and 
hedging: Evidence from oil and gas firms”; The Accounting Review, Vol. 77, Nº1, pp. 
127-160.  
Rad, S. E. M., H. Salehi and H. V. Pour (2016), “The Impact of Audit Quality and 
Ownership Structure on Earnings Management of Listed Firms on Tehran Stock 
Exchange”, International Business Management, Vol. 10, Nº10, pp. 1827-1832.  
Roychowdhury, S. (2006), “Earnings management through real activities 
manipulation”, Journal of accounting and economics, Vol. 42, Nº3, pp. 335-370. 
Shaw, K. W. (2003), “Corporate disclosure quality, earnings smoothing, and earnings' 
timeliness”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 56, Nº12, pp. 1043-1050.  
Smith, C. W. and R. M. Stulz (1985), “The determinants of firms' hedging 
policies”, Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, Vol. 20, Nº4, pp. 391-405.  
Stickney, C. P. and V. E. McGee (1983), “Effective corporate tax rates the effect of 
size, capital intensity, leverage, and other factors”, Journal of accounting and public 
policy, Vol. 1, Nº2, pp. 125-152.  
Swiston, A. J. (2008), “A US Financial Conditions Index: Putting Credit Where Credit 
is Due”, IMF Working Papers, pp. 1-35. 
48 
Tufano, P. (1996), “Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management 
practices in the gold mining industry”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 51, Nº4, pp. 1097-
1137. 
Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild and K. L. Wild (1995), “Managerial ownership, accounting 
choices, and informativeness of earnings”, Journal of accounting and economics, Vol. 
20, Nº1, pp. 61-91.  
Warren, A. C. (2004), “US income taxation of new financial products”, Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 88, Nº5, pp. 899-923.  
Watts, R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman, (1990), “Positive accounting theory: a ten year 
perspective”, The Accounting review, pp. 131-156.  
Zang, A. Y. (2011), “Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and 
accrual-based earnings management”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 87, Nº2, pp. 675-
703. 
Zimmerman, J. L. (1983), “Taxes and firm size”, Journal of accounting and 
economics, Vol. 5, pp. 119-149. 
49 
7. Annex
Table 7: Variables measurement and sources (part 1) 
Variables Measurement Source 
AM Residual of equation (3.1) for each firm and year Datastream, 
AM_FLEX 




1 if the change in earnings per share is between 0 
and 2 cents, 0 otherwise. 
Datastream 










CREDIT equals the change in the first principal 
component of the qualitative data of Bank Lending 
Survey about Portuguese banks’ terms and 
conditions regarding firms’ credit, after recalling it 
to have mean 100 and standard deviation 10. 
BORROWERS equals 1 if LTDEBT is on the top 
quartile (among firms with increases in long-term 






CAP_INT Net property, plant and equipment / total assets Datastream 
CFO Cash-flow from operations / lagged total assets Datastream 
CFO_RM CFO - RM Datastream 
CONC 
1 if no shareholder holds more than 25% of 





Table 8: Variables measurement and sources (part 2) 
Variables Measurement Source 
CONSTRAINTS 
Sums 1 in each of these circumstances: if firms’ 
operational cycle or Z-score (Altman, 2000) is in 
the first quartile of the sample; if insider ownership 
(closely held shares / common shares outstanding) 
and net operating assets (scaled by lagged total 
sales) are in the top quartile in the beginning of the 










Average days receivables are outstanding + average 
days stocks are held – average days payables are 
outstanding 
Datastream 




1 if net income net of earnings management are 
above dividends paid in the previous year and the 
firm pays dividends in the current year, 0 otherwise 
Datastream 
DY Dividends / market capitalization Datastream 
EM AM + RM Datastream 
ETR1 Tax expenses / pre-tax income Datastream 
ETR2 Tax expenses / cash-flow from operations Datastream 
HEALTH 
 1 if the Z-score, calculated as in Altman (2000),  is 
above sample median, 0 otherwise 
Datastream 
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Table 9: Variables measurement and sources (part 3) 
Variables Measurement Source 
INSIDER 
1 if the ratio between closely held shares and 
common shares outstanding is above sample 
median, 0 otherwise; Closely held shares denotes 
shares owned by insiders which implies officers, 
directors and their families, shares held in trust, 
shares of the company held by another 
corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary 
capacity by financial institutions), shares held by 
pension/benefit plans and shares held by 
individuals who hold 5% or more of the 
outstanding shares 
Datastream 
INV_INT Inventories / total assets Datastream 
ISALES 
sales from production made abroad scaled by  
lagged total sales 
Datastream 
LEV Total debt / total assets Datastream 
LEV_D 
Equals 1 if LEV  is above sample median, 0 
otherwise 
Datastream 
LTDEBT Long term debt / logarithm of lagged total assets Datastream 
MTB Market capitalization / shareholders’ funds Datastream 
MTR 




1 if net operating assets (scaled by lagged total 
sales) are above sample median, 0 otherwise; Net 
operating assets equals: (total assets - cash - total 
liabilities + total debt)  
Datastream 
PAYOUT 




Table 10: Variables measurement and sources (part 4) 
Variables Measurement Source 
RM 




Sum of squared residuals from equation (3.2) for 
each firm 
Datastream 
ROA Net income / total assets Datastream 
ROA_AM 








The natural logarithm of the sum of market 
capitalization with preferred stock, minority 
interests and total debt minus cash 
Datastream 
SMOOTHERS 1 if ROA is between 0 and 0.01, 0 otherwise Datastream 
STDEBT Short term debt / logarithm of lagged total assets Datastream 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics (part 1) 
 Mean  Std. Dev. Qaurtile 1 Median Q3 
AMt 0.0000 0.0529 -0.0225 0.0016 0.0217 
AM_FLEXt 0.0291 0.0512 0.0036 0.0150 0.0296 
BEATERSt 0.0933 0.2913 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BIG4t 0.6021 0.4901 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BOARDt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
BORROWERSt -0.1564 4.2662 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CAP_INTt 0.3237 0.1959 0.1403 0.3390 0.4807 
CFOt 0.0503 0.0787 0.0103 0.0529 0.0950 
|CFO|t 0.0503 0.0787 0.0103 0.0529 0.0950 
CFO_RMt 0.0471 0.0627 0.0058 0.0502 0.0789 
CONCt 0.3037 0.4604 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CONCt-1 0.3120 0.4640 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
CONSTRAINTSt 1.9455 1.1026 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 
CONVEXt 5.2290 18.644 -6.3195 4.1956 21.743 
CONVEXt-1 4.6768 18.522 -6.8788 3.7352 20.229 
CYCLEt 0.5000 0.5007 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
CYCLEt-1 0.5061 0.5007 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
DERIVt 0.4429 0.4973 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
DIVIDt 0.1880 0.3913 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
DYt-1 0.0303 0.0446 0.0000 0.0133 0.0467 
EMt 0.0000 0.0427 -0.0155 0.0002 0.0173 
|EM|t 0.0276 0.0326 0.0075 0.0168 0.0361 
ETR1t 0.2036 0.1550 0.0246 0.2107 0.3124 
ETR2t 0.1369 0.1457 0.0036 0.0989 0.1991 
HEALTHt 0.4987 0.5007 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
HEALTHt-1 0.5029 0.5007 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
INSIDERt 0.5000 0.5006 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
INSIDERt-1 0.4879 0.5005 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics (part 2) 
  Mean  Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
INV_INTt 0.0846 0.0959 0.0159 0.0580 0.1111 
ISALESt 0.3062 0.3419 0.0000 0.1881 0.5493 
LEV_Dt-1 0.4987 0.5007 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
LEVt-1 0.4349 0.2019 0.2932 0.4245 0.5494 
LTDEBTt 58462 138705 2468 12945 47161 
MTBt-1 1.6201 3.6598 0.5722 1.1057 2.2630 
MTRt 24.609 7.5762 25.000 27.500 27.500 
NOAt-1 0.5179 0.5004 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
PAYOUTt 0.4507 3.4401 0.0000 0.0679 0.5187 
RMt 0.0000 0.0456 -0.0181 0.0014 0.0201 
RM_FLEXt 0.0199 0.0320 0.0030 0.0088 0.0229 
ROAt 0.0100 0.0644 0.0014 0.0214 0.0401 
ROA_AMt 0.0141 0.0931 -0.0177 0.0197 0.0482 
ROA_EMt 0.0131 0.0834 -0.0114 0.0195 0.0404 
SIZEt-1 13.203 1.799 11.790 13.114 14.548 
SMOOTHERSt 0.1280 0.3345 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
STDEBTt 17655 33004 2004.9 6214.7 17167 
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Table 13: Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) pairwise correlation coefficients in percentage - variables 
in equation (3.3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
BIG4t (1) -33*** 15*** 16*** -7 11* 6 10* 19*** -6 -4 22*** 36*** 
BOARDt (2) -33*** -37*** -7 16*** -14** -2 -24*** -27*** -13** 3 -34*** -95*** 
CFOt (3) 14** -31*** 12** -29*** 37*** 8 34*** 27*** -2 48*** 49*** 40*** 
CONCt-1 (4) 16*** -1 7 -1 4 -24*** 17*** 9* 16*** -1 14** 8 
CYCLEt-1 (5) -7 15*** -24*** -1 -11** 18*** -26*** -3 8 1 -18*** -23*** 
HEALTHt-1 (6) 11* -22*** 36*** 4 -11** 6 26*** 2 -29*** 0 32*** 16*** 
INSIDERt-1 (7) 6 -16*** 7 -24*** 18*** 6 3 2 5 1 10* 6 
MTBt-1 (8) 6 6 31*** 16*** -15*** 7 -1 -4 -3 -4 32*** 36*** 
MTR (9) 19*** -24*** 23*** 10* -4 3 0 -1 9 2 31*** 23*** 
NOAt-1 (10) -6 -12** -1 16*** 8 -29*** 5 -2 9* 0 -2 15*** 
RM (11) 0 -2 56*** -2 7 4 2 11** 1 0 -10* -5 
ROA_EM (12) 15** -6 21*** 2 -14** 13** 12** 7 27*** -2 0 37*** 
SIZEt-1 (13) 36*** -65*** 36*** 10* -23*** 15*** 4 13** 28*** 15*** -2 15*** 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively. 
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Table 14: Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) pairwise correlation coefficients in percentage - variables in 
equation (3.4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
AMt (1) -2 2 -3 2 1 1 12** 12** -1 -57*** -48*** 0 
BIG4t (2) -3 -33*** 20*** -6 17*** 4 10* 19*** -6 -4 16*** 36*** 
BOARDt (3) 6 -33*** -8 15*** -13** 4 -24*** -27*** -13** 3 -28*** -95*** 
CONCt (4) -2 20*** 0 -2 6 -24*** 17*** 10* 15*** 1 12** 10* 
CYCLEt (5) 0 -6 12** -2 -9 21*** -27*** -10* 8 5 -9* -21*** 
HEALTHt (6) 1 17*** -20*** 6 -9 3 18*** 16*** -27*** 3 39*** 13** 
INSIDERt (7) 1 4 -8 -24*** 21*** 3 1 -6 2 -2 5 -2 
MTBt-1 (8) 0 6 6 19*** -20*** 5 1 -4 -3 -4 17*** 36*** 
MTRt (9) 13** 19*** -24*** 11** -11** 17*** -7 -1 9 2 29*** 23*** 
NOAt-1 (10) 1 -6 -12** 15*** 8 -27*** 2 -2 9* 0 -1 15*** 
RMt (11) -56*** 0 -2 0 7 6 -1 11** 1 0 51*** -5 
ROA_AMt (12) -10* 14** -7 2 -6 19*** 9* 9 25*** -2 39*** 28*** 
SIZEt-1 (13) 2 36*** -65*** 12** -21*** 13** -4 13** 28*** 15*** -2 13** 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively. 
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Table 15: Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) pairwise 
correlation coefficients in percentage - variables in equation (3.6) and (3.7) (part 1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AM_FLEXt (1) -19*** 64*** -39*** -15*** -4 -31*** 2 
BIG4t (2) -16*** -33*** 4 16*** 1 26*** 2 
BOARDt (3) 46*** -33*** -35*** -7 1 -57*** -5 
CAP_INTt (4) -7 5 -20*** 2 23*** 17*** -25*** 
CONCt-1 (5) -9 16*** -1 1 2 15*** -1 
CONVEXt (6) 9 0 -10* 21*** 1 -3 -98*** 
DERIVt (7) -27*** 26*** -38*** 18*** 15*** -3 6 
ETR1t (8) -11** 2 7 -24*** -1 -98*** 6 
ETR2t (9) -1 4 -15** -9* 4 -34*** 15*** 38*** 
INSIDERt-1 (10) -5 6 -16*** 2 -24*** -10* 10* 10* 
INV_INTt (11) -9* 4 -4 8 -14** 2 4 -3 
LEV_Dt-1 (12) 19*** 2 0 -1 18*** 22*** -12** -23*** 
MTBt-1 (13) -18*** 6 6 -1 16*** -12** 9 13** 
RM_FLEXt (14) 52*** -14** 69*** -31*** -2 -23*** -24*** 22*** 
ROAt (15) -52*** 11* -21*** -2 6 -28*** 26*** 32*** 
SIZEt-1 (16) -45*** 36*** -65*** 37*** 10* -3 53*** 7 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 16: Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) pairwise 
correlation coefficients in percentage - variables in equation (3.6) and (3.7) (part 2) 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
AM_FLEXt (1) -12** 3 -1 15*** -12** 73*** -25*** -63*** 
BIG4t (2) 7 6 13** 2 10* -11* 14** 36*** 
BOARDt (3) -23*** -2 -7 4 -24*** 56*** -34*** -95*** 
CAP_INTt (4) 0 3 23*** -1 11* -29*** 8 36*** 
CONCt-1 (5) 8 -24*** -6 18*** 17*** -10* 17*** 8 
CONVEXt (6) -38*** -10* 8 23*** -16*** -13** -20*** -4 
DERIVt (7) 21*** 10* 13** -12** 21*** -24*** 31*** 54*** 
ETR1t (8) 40*** 10* -7 -24*** 17*** 10* 24*** 8 
ETR2t (9) 2 -5 -11** 6 -7 29*** 24*** 
INSIDERt-1 (10) 5 20*** -17*** 3 0 12** 6 
INV_INTt (11) 1 21*** -5 -2 -1 -5 6 
LEV_Dt-1 (12) -5 -17*** -7 -4 1 -37*** 0 
MTBt-1 (13) 0 -1 -5 0 -10* 35*** 36*** 
RM_FLEXt (14) 1 2 -8 -2 2 -17*** -55*** 
ROAt (15) 9 15*** -1 -35*** 23*** -10* 37*** 
SIZEt-1 (16) 12** 4 -7 0 13** -49*** 35*** 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
59 
Table 17: Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) pairwise correlation coefficients in percentage - 
variables in equation (3.8) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
BOARDt (1) 5 16*** -57*** -51*** -14** -30*** -89*** -24*** -34*** -95*** -76*** 
CONVEXt-1 (2) -3 -3 0 -6 -14** -3 -7 -15*** -22*** -6 3 
CYCLEt-1 (3) 15*** -4 4 0 -11** 34*** -13** -26*** -11* -23*** -14** 
DERIVt (4) -38*** 0 4 49*** 19*** 27*** 51*** 21*** 31*** 54*** 42*** 
DYt-1 (5) -22*** -1 3 34*** 16*** 12** 46*** 8 44*** 50*** 42*** 
HEALTHt-1 (6) -22*** -12** -11** 19*** 6 16*** 0 26*** 39*** 16*** -6 
ISALESt (7) -22*** 0 33*** 28*** 7 12** 30*** 2 8 27*** 28*** 
LTDEBTt (8) -23*** -1 -4 31*** 31*** -10* 13** 23*** 21*** 91*** 72*** 
MTBt-1 (9) 6 -16*** -15*** 9 -5 7 0 -1 35*** 36*** 16*** 
ROAt (10) -21*** -28*** 0 26*** 24*** 31*** 10* 12** 23*** 37*** 13** 
SIZEt-1 (11) -65*** -6 -23*** 53*** 33*** 15*** 26*** 63*** 13** 35*** 76*** 
STDEBTt (12) -26*** 1 -5 29*** 30*** -9 16*** 89*** 1 12** 63*** 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively. 
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Table 18: Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) pairwise 
correlation coefficients in percentage - variables in equation (3.9) (part 1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AM_FLEXt (1) 64*** -4 18*** -31*** 40*** 
BOARDt (2) 46*** 1 16*** -57*** 29*** 
|CFO|t (3) -25*** -23*** -16*** -28*** 31*** -27*** 
CONVEXt (4) 9 -10* -14** -4 -3 2 
CYCLEt-1 (5) 0 15*** -28*** -4 4 2 
DERIVt (6) -27*** -38*** 24*** -3 4 -24*** 
|EM|t (7) 57*** 29*** -20*** 2 -4 -25*** 
HEALTHt-1 (8) -23*** -22*** 39*** -8 -11** 19*** -15*** 
LEV_Dt-1 (9) 19*** 0 -23*** 22*** -3 -12** 9* 
MTBt-1 (10) -18*** 6 31*** -12** -15*** 9 -9* 
PAYOUTt (11) -3 -2 5 8 10* 6 -4 
RM_FLEXt (12) 52*** 69*** -15*** -23*** 20*** -24*** 39*** 
ROA_EMt (13) -1 -6 25*** -12** -14** 11** 4 
SIZEt-1 (14) -45*** -65*** 39*** -3 -23*** 53*** -32*** 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 19: Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) pairwise 
correlation coefficients in percentage - variables in equation (3.9) (part 2) 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
AM_FLEXt (1) -21*** 15*** -12** -32*** 73*** -28*** -63*** 
BOARDt (2) -14** 4 -24*** -41*** 56*** -34*** -95*** 
|CFO|t (3) 38*** -24*** 42*** 51*** -28*** 60*** 48*** 
CONVEXt (4) -9 23*** -16*** -3 -13** -23*** -4 
CYCLEt-1 (5) -11** -3 -26*** -8 25*** -18*** -23*** 
DERIVt (6) 19*** -12** 21*** 38*** -24*** 30*** 54*** 
|EM|t (7) -11** 7 -5 -31*** 34*** -24*** -30*** 
HEALTHt-1 (8) -47*** 26*** 28*** -3 32*** 16*** 
LEV_Dt-1 (9) -47*** -4 -28*** 1 -37*** 0 
MTBt-1 (10) 7 0 18*** -10* 32*** 36*** 
PAYOUTt (11) 10* -12** -6 -17*** 55*** 41*** 
RM_FLEXt (12) -14** -2 2 1 -12** -55*** 
ROA_EMt (13) 13** -16*** 7 2 -1 37*** 
SIZEt-1 (14) 15*** 0 13** -2 -49*** 15*** 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 20: Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) pairwise correlation coefficients in percentage - 
variables in equation (3.10) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
BEATERSt (1) -5 -8 -3 -4 4 7 -7 -7 -3 14** -3 
BORROWERSt (2) -5 0 0 4 1 -8 16*** 7 1 5 2 
CFO_RMt (3) -7 2 19*** 9* -5 -24*** 39*** 63*** 50*** -24*** 26*** 
CONSTRAINTSt (4) -2 0 13** 6 -12** 33*** 13** 5 17*** -11* 12** 
DIVIDt (5) -4 3 12** 6 25*** 4 16*** -18*** 12** -2 15*** 
EMt (6) 5 0 -6 -10* 20*** -6 9* -25*** -3 -2 -8 
LEVt-1 (7) 4 -8 -26*** 34*** 0 -4 -3 -36*** 4 -2 26*** 
MTBt-1 (8) -5 4 25*** 12** 14** 11** 2 32*** 36*** -3 16*** 
ROA_EMt (9) -4 3 27*** 8 -7 15*** 4 7 37*** -13** 15*** 
SIZEt-1 (10) -3 0 46*** 16*** 11** 0 -1 13** 15*** -12** 76*** 
SMOOTHERSt (11) 14** 10* -21*** -9* -2 0 -4 4 -3 -13** -6 
STDEBTt (12) -1 4 12** 10* 6 0 6 1 5 63*** -8 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
